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Inflation Targeting in the Context of IMF–Supported
Adjustment Programs
MARIO I. BLEJER, ALFREDO M. LEONE, PAU RABANAL,
and GERD SCHWARTZ*
This paper argues that the IMF’s traditional monetary conditionality—a ceiling on
net domestic assets of the central bank and a floor on its net international reserves—
should be adapted in IMF-supported adjustment programs with countries that have
a framework of explicit inflation targets for the implementation of monetary policy.
This adaptation should aim at enhancing correspondence and consistency between
the monetary objectives of the central bank and the targets established under the
IMF-supported adjustment program, as well as between the different instruments
used to achieve the policy objectives and targets. The paper reviews various general
options in this regard, and, using the case of Brazil as an example, demonstrates how
these options may be implemented in practice. [JEL E52, E31, E17]
O
ver the past decade, the staff of the IMF has frequently been engaged in
assessing the functioning and effectiveness of inflation targeting in IMF
member countries that adopted this scheme as their monetary policy framework.
As inflation targets were first embraced by various industrialized economies,
however, this involvement was restricted to the IMF’s surveillance function—
that is, it was part of the macroeconomic analyses performed during the regular
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More recently, however, a number of emerging market economies have aban-
doned their fixed exchange rate regimes and moved toward a flexible exchange
rate system with an explicit inflation targeting framework for monetary policy. In
this context, it became increasingly likely that the IMF would face a situation in
which it would be called upon to provide financial assistance—and therefore agree
on a financial program—with a country that is using, or has decided to adopt,
explicit inflation targets as the key component of its monetary policy framework.
Indeed, shortly after adopting a floating exchange rate regime in mid-January
1999, the Brazilian authorities announced their intention to put in place a formal
inflation targeting framework and, in the months that followed, the framework was
implemented in the context of the ongoing IMF-supported adjustment program. 
These developments posed particular analytical and practical challenges in
terms of the operational procedures of the IMF in its financial relations with its
member countries. The challenge resulted from the need to reconcile the inflation
targeting framework with the conceptual and practical aspects of conditionality.
Conditionality is the device utilized by the IMF in its financial programs, to estab-
lish safeguards that would help to maintain a country’s external viability and
ensure that its resources are only used temporarily. This, in turn, implies the adop-
tion of so-called performance criteria—that is, formal quantitative targets on a
defined number of variables, agreed between the member country and the IMF.
The evolution of these variables is subject to verification, and fulfillment of these
criteria is the condition for a disbursement to take place. In the monetary policy
area, performance criteria in IMF-supported adjustment programs (henceforth
IMF programs) have traditionally been set in terms of specific quantitative limits
on the evolution of certain monetary variables. Typically, a floor is set for the level
of net international reserves (NIR) and a ceiling is established on the net domestic
assets (NDA) of the central bank. 
At first sight, therefore, it would appear that the inflation targeting framework,
by the very nature of its operating procedures, may not be compatible with the
traditional quantitative monetary conditionality framework usually embodied in
IMF programs. This is so because the actual implementation of inflation targeting
is largely based on the premise that an independent central bank can use, at its own
discretion, its various policy instruments, in the proportions considered appro-
priate in each particular circumstance, to ensure the attainment of its inflation
goal. This seems to clash with a scheme that sets explicit and somewhat rigorous
quantitative objectives for key monetary variables. 
In these circumstances, and considering that it is the prerogative of each
member country to adopt a monetary policy framework of its choice, the IMF
faced the question of whether and how to adapt monetary conditionality to the
specific features of monetary policy under inflation targeting. In general, it was
concluded that, in principle, inflation targeting could be accommodated within the
traditional structure of monetary conditionality in IMF programs, given that this
conditionality focuses primarily on a program’s balance of payments objective. At
the same time, it was also recognized that it may be desirable to modify and
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the specific functioning of the inflation targeting framework.1
A main objective of this paper is, therefore, to consider the issues that arise
from the adoption of inflation targeting in the context of the conditionality
embodied in IMF programs, and to discuss a number of options for adapting the
monetary conditionality of the programs to these particular cases. The next section
briefly reviews in more detail the role of monetary conditionality in IMF programs.
I. IMF Programs: The Role of Conditionality
In IMF programs, conditionality refers to the linkage between the achievement of
a set of policy objectives and the continuous access to IMF resources.2 The policy
objectives are agreed between the IMF and the authorities of the member country,
and, while the specific objectives vary from country to country, attaining a viable
balance of payments position is the sine qua non target in every program. In this
sense, conditionality has a double objective: it helps countries to maintain or
regain financial discipline, and it provides a safeguard for the IMF’s financial
resources—that is, it helps ensure that the temporary financial support provided by
the IMF can be repaid over a reasonably short period of time. The specification of
the policy objectives and calibration of the quantitative targets should ensure that
the need for financing is only temporary and that the borrowed funds will be
repaid. Put another way, conditionality provides a yardstick for evaluating whether
the policies that are being carried out are moving the country toward the achieve-
ment of the main policy objectives, in particular a sustainable external balance. By
doing so, conditionality also ensures the temporary use of Fund resources.3
The effective implementation of conditionality does not involve day-to-day
monitoring of a country’s macroeconomic policies but requires a mechanism for
assessing whether policies are on track for achieving their stated goals, or whether
they need to be adjusted in response to unanticipated shocks, changes in economic
relationships, or other new information. The monitoring mechanism in IMF
programs consists of a set of explicit criteria—particularly performance criteria,
but also indicative targets and structural benchmarks—that should be met if a
country wishes to make further drawings under the program. These performance
criteria typically refer to key macroeconomic variables—fiscal and monetary
policy outcomes, including fiscal balances (for example, overall or primary
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1A number of internal documents were prepared and discussed within the IMF to clarify the various
aspects of this approach. Some of the considerations and arguments raised in these discussions are
reflected in various parts of this paper.
2The word “conditionality” does not appear in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, and the concept
evolved in stages. For a discussion of the legal aspects of the development of IMF conditionality, see Gold
(1979). Guitián (1981) discusses the evolution of conditionality from an economic point of view.
3Analogies could be drawn between IMF lending to countries and central bank lending to troubled
financial institutions, as both are ultimately aimed at maintaining or regaining financial stability and
supporting economic growth. In both cases, specific contractual arrangements (such as conditionality) are
intended to help, among others, to contain moral hazard (that is, the borrower’s incentive to take on more
risk after obtaining financial support), and to safeguard an orderly repayment of the borrowed resources.
See Goodfriend and Lacker (1999) for a discussion related to central bank lending.Mario I.Blejer,Alfredo M.Leone,Pau Rabanal,and Gerd Schwartz
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balances), indebtedness (for example, public sector debt, public external debt, and
its short-term component), and monetary variables, such as NIR and NDA4—that
indicate whether macroeconomic policies are on track. Also, IMF programs may
include indicators related to certain structural reform measures (for example,
structural benchmarks on specific reforms to be implemented). While performance
criteria permit a backward-looking assessment of policies, periodic program
reviews, which are often carried out quarterly, provide for a forward-looking
overall assessment of the program vis-à-vis the government’s stated macro-
economic policy objectives.
Quantitative macroeconomic performance criteria in IMF programs do not
rely on a specific macroeconomic model. They do, however, make use of various
balance-sheet identities that link monetary and fiscal variables with the balance of
payments to ensure that the program is internally consistent. In general, these
performance criteria may best be thought of as signaling devices that flag a
possible need for corrective action in case of deviations.
II. Monetary Conditionality: The Traditional Approach and 
Its Implications for Inflation Targeting
Monetary policy conditionality has been at the core of IMF program condition-
ality. As mentioned above, it has traditionally relied on two performance criteria:
a ceiling on a central bank’s NDA and a floor on its NIR.5 Rooted in concepts that
arise from the so-called “monetary approach to the balance of payments,” and
originally applied mostly in the context of fixed exchange rates, where the balance
of payments has to adjust to monetary disequilibria, this methodology has come to
be used under different monetary policy frameworks. Its primary focus has always
been to ensure that a program maintains or leads to external viability rather than
to impose tight control over inflation. In this context, performance criteria that set
a floor on NIR are designed to indicate whether a program is likely to achieve its
external objective. On the other hand, the ceiling on NDA could be seen as an
additional protection, since it seeks to ensure that the external objective is not
jeopardized by excessive credit expansion or by sterilized intervention (that is, by
compensating unprogrammed NIR losses through additional credit creation),
which is particularly relevant under fixed exchange rate regimes. In general, this
framework is rooted in the assumption that the demand for base money matters
from a macroeconomic perspective, and that it is stable and predictable.
In practice, the expected functioning of the NIR/NDA performance criteria
would be as follows. An anticipated, or baseline, path for NIR is projected and a
floor for NIR is set at or somewhat below the baseline. At the same time, the NDA
ceiling is set at a level that, in conjunction with the projected evolution of velocity,
is consistent with the NIR baseline. If a country’s actual NIR were to start falling
4Usually, NDA are defined to equal base money minus NIR.
5While these have been by far the most common variables used in the design of monetary condition-
ality, in many countries other monetary aggregates have been targeted, and, in some cases, subceilings for
specific types of domestic assets were also implemented.INFLATION TARGETING IN IMF-SUPPORTED ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
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toward the agreed NIR floor—maybe because of a sudden external shock—mone-
tary policy would need to be tightened, usually through open market operations,
to help stop further NIR losses. In contrast, as long as actual NIR remain close to
their baseline, the ceiling on NDA effectively limits base money expansion,
thereby preventing monetary policies from putting additional pressure on the
external balance and fueling inflation. More generally, the NIR/NDA mechanism
sets off warning signals that there is a need for policy action, usually to tighten
monetary policies, when NIR fall too low or when there is an oversterilization of
unprogrammed sales of NIR. By providing a simple automatic signal, the frame-
work helps country authorities to bring about needed policy actions that it may be
reluctant to carry out otherwise. Still, the NIR/NDA framework does not prevent
larger-than-programmed NIR increases from fueling monetary expansion and,
thus, potentially inflation. A general overview is provided in Table 1.
Different views may reasonably be held on the appropriateness of the tradi-
tional NIR/NDA framework under an inflation targeting regime. As for the NIR
floors, for example, it could be argued that they no longer have a place in this
context, given that inflation targeting goes hand-in-hand with floating exchange
rates.6 However, while under inflation targeting the central bank would not be
expected to use its NIR to stabilize the exchange rate per se, it may react to move-
ments of the exchange rate to the extent that they are perceived to threaten the
inflation target. As most floats are not pure floats, trade-offs between domestic
objectives (that is, inflation) and external objectives (that is, external viability)
may be unavoidable, at least conceptually. Thus, even under flexible exchange
rates, retaining an NIR floor simply reflects the fact that one important aspect of
an IMF program is to safeguard external viability, independent of the monetary
policy framework.
In contrast, it could be argued that retaining a ceiling on NDA under inflation
targeting could help prevent large departures from the inflation objective—that is,
NDA ceilings could reinforce a country’s commitment to a flexible exchange rate
policy and limit sterilized foreign exchange market intervention and base money
expansion when the external position is weak.7 This view implicitly assumes that
there exists a stable relationship between NDA and inflation. In most inflation
targeting countries, however, it has been difficult to find robust empirical evidence
on the existence of such a relationship. Hence, NDA ceilings would neither
provide adequate guidance to monetary policies aimed at meeting an inflation
target, nor would they provide a helpful trigger or focus for discussions on the
monetary policy stance in an IMF program context, given the strong likelihood of
false alarms.
Similarly, it could also be argued that maintaining NDA ceilings in an infla-
tion targeting context could help to strengthen the credibility of the inflation target
6Note though, that some inflation targeting countries maintain managed floats, sometimes even with
exchange rate bands. This could potentially lead to conflicts between the policy objectives regarding the
inflation target and the exchange rate.
7Such safeguards would seem especially relevant when country authorities view exchange market
pressures as essentially short lived.by protecting the central bank from pressures to monetize fiscal deficits. IMF
programs always contain fiscal conditionality, however, which is the more direct
(and therefore better suited) instrument to help ensure fiscal sustainability—that
is, to ensure that there is no “fiscal dominance,” which is commonly considered a
precondition for successful implementation of inflation targeting.8
More generally, with a central bank that targets inflation and an IMF program
that focuses on the quantity-based framework of NDA ceilings, there would not
necessarily be a clear correspondence between the monetary objectives underlying
the program and the relevant instruments to achieve the inflation targets. In addi-
tion, communication with the markets and the public regarding the stance of
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Table 1. General Overview on the Functioning of the NIR/NDA
Mechanism
Net Domestic Assets (NDA)

































Only the NIR target has been met.
Usually, this reflects an
overexpansion of base money,
even beyond nonsterilization of
the higher-than-programmed NIR;
it could also reflect a flawed initial
projection of base money. Policy
action: tighten monetary policy to
reduce NDA.
The targets for NIR and NDA have
been met. There may be a need to
reassess if the initial program
projections may have been flawed,
and, if needed, reprogram future
targets accordingly. No immediate
policy action is needed; discretion
over monetary policy is retained
(for example, the framework allows
a sudden surge in NIR to be
accompanied by a commensurate
increase in base money).
The targets for NIR and NDA
have not been met. This reflects
insufficient monetary tightening
(NIR losses have been
oversterilized). Policy action:
tighten monetary policy to reduce
NDA and help prevent further NIR
losses.
Only the NDA target has been met.
In theory, further NIR losses could
be sterilized as long as actual NDA
remains below the NDA ceiling. In
practice, monetary policy should be
kept tight to help stem further NIR
losses. There is a need to reassess
targets and policies. Were there
flaws in the initial base money
projections used to derive the NDA
ceilings? Are exchange rate policies
and/or fiscal policies sustainable?






8For an analysis of strategic and operational issues relevant to the implementation of inflation
targeting frameworks, see Blejer and others (2000).monetary policy could easily become confusing. This is important because infla-
tion targeting, by its very nature, relies critically on transparency of the central
bank’s policy actions. Since, as already pointed out, inflation is usually not
primarily a function of NDA or its components, it is unlikely to respond
predictably or immediately to changes in NDA or base money.
As a result, retaining an NDA ceiling—or any additional monetary target
(such as exchange rate bands or caps on money growth)—could easily result in
conflicting signals and therefore confuse markets when there is, in fact, no need
to change monetary policy from the point of view of the inflation objective.9
For example, one may easily conceive a situation where actual NDA exceeds
the NDA ceiling, while both actual and projected inflation are still within their
target. Should monetary policy be tightened in these circumstances, or should
the NDA ceiling be revised upward? Since inflation is the target, an upward
adjustment of the NDA ceiling seems to be the only appropriate course of
action. Similarly, when actual NIR is running significantly above the NIR floor,
while base money is close to the projected baseline, monetary policies could
only be eased to the extent that the inflation objective is not jeopardized. 
In general, as shown in Table 2, when inflation is the overriding objective,
having an NDA ceiling may be considered somewhat superfluous or, at least, a
nonbinding constraint. 
In light of these various considerations, current thinking—as will be
discussed below in the context of the Brazilian program—would hold that NIR
floors would continue to be needed to safeguard an IMF program’s external objec-
tives, but that NDA ceilings would not necessarily be the preferred choice for
monetary conditionality.
III. Options for Implementing and Strengthening Monetary
Conditionality Under Inflation Targeting 
Inflation targets provide an anchor for inflation expectations. While important
issues remain as to when and under what conditions inflation targeting would be
preferred to an exchange-rate-based stabilization, an increasing number of coun-
tries have abandoned fixed exchange rates and moved toward formal inflation
targeting.10 In light of the inconsistencies that may arise when applying tradi-
tional monetary conditionality under inflation targeting, it was felt that monetary
conditionality should be modified to reflect more closely the main parameters of
INFLATION TARGETING IN IMF-SUPPORTED ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
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9Also see, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) for a discussion of potential problems of
“two-pillar” frameworks, where monetary policy is geared toward meeting both an inflation objective and
another objective, such as money growth.
10As argued by Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000), the foundations for successful full-fledged
inflation targeting are built on the following: a strong fiscal position and entrenched macroeconomic
stability; a well-developed financial system; central bank instrument independence and a mandate to
achieve price stability; a reasonably well understood transmission mechanism between monetary policy
actions and inflation; a sound methodology for constructing inflation forecasts; and transparency of mone-
tary policy to build accountability and credibility. However, largely it still remains to be seen to what
extent the absence of any of these elements, including during the initial phases of an inflation targeting
regime, may limit the ultimate success of inflation targeting.Mario I.Blejer,Alfredo M.Leone,Pau Rabanal,and Gerd Schwartz
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decision making under inflation targeting. Ideally, under inflation targeting
monetary conditionality should be geared toward evaluating the monetary policy
stance vis-à-vis the government’s announced inflation target. This would require
an extremely good understanding of all the elements involved, however,
including, for example, the transmission channels and the precise parameters of
monetary policy and the external environment. 
Moreover, monetary conditionality should primarily apply to specific
policy actions and policy instruments (for example, interest rates), since
country authorities cannot commit to achieve a particular level of a variable
over which they do not exercise some decisive degree of control (for example,
interest rate spreads). It could be argued that, ideally, monetary conditionality
should involve the various parameters of a policy reaction function—that is, the
summary forward-looking rule governing the policy responses to projected
deviations of inflation from the inflation target. Following this reasoning, a
potential conditionality device for IMF programs under inflation targeting
could consist of an operational rule for reacting to actual or expected deviations
from the targeted inflation path. This rule should, again ideally, be a simple but
robust reaction function that relates changes in an instrument (for example,
interest rates) to deviations of inflation from its target. Note that this would be
far more specific, and therefore restrictive in terms of the policy response, than
the conditionality under the NIR/NDA mechanism, which simply sets off a
warning signal that policies need to be tightened without specifying by how
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much. In practice, it would be impossible to specify the exact timing and size
of the response parameter—that is, to determine in advance by how much and
when interest rates should be adjusted when projected inflation deviates from
its target by a given amount. Also, while a very specific reaction function may
work in one program, this may not be sufficiently general and flexible to
accommodate different approaches to inflation targeting, and therefore, given
the IMF’s commitment to provide equality of treatment to all its members, this
could possibly entail some problems of cross-country comparability.
Despite these limitations, and while it may neither be possible nor even desir-
able to specify in advance a very precise policy reaction function, at least not for
the purpose of monetary conditionality in an IMF program context, it would still
seem useful to have a simple forward-looking mechanism for gauging the mone-
tary policy stance vis-à-vis the inflation target. In this context, it could be useful
to consider simple monetary policy rules, such as a Taylor rule for the short-term
interest rate or a McCallum rule for the monetary base. In general, such rules are
only of limited use in guiding policy decisions, because it could easily be coun-
terproductive for the monetary authorities to commit to a simple instrument rule
in pursuing their ultimate target, the inflation outcome.11 It is generally acknowl-
edged, though, that simple policy rules may serve as rough benchmarks for good
monetary policy,12 which makes them interesting as a potential conditionality
device in an IMF program context. In other words, simple policy rules can serve
as a starting point for thinking about whether the monetary policy stance is appro-
priate, but mechanically applying them would not be recommendable for a poli-
cymaker facing real-time decisions.
In general, monetary policy rules are quite flexible to encompass a range of
relevant information. A simple Taylor rule,13 for example, can be expressed as 
r = r*+   α (Y – Y*) +β (π –π *), where r is the nominal short-term interest rate, r*
is an estimated nominal equilibrium interest rate that is consistent with the target
inflation rate (that is, r*=r – + π * with r – being the equilibrium real interest rate
and π * being the relevant inflation target); Y is output and Y* is capacity output;
π is inflation (either actual or projected); and α and β  are coefficients, with
α≥ 0 (and typically between 0 and 0.5, depending on the degree to which the
output gap figures in the central bank’s reaction function) and β > 0 (and typi-
cally between 1.5 and 2, so that the nominal short-term interest rate moves
significantly in response to deviations of inflation from the inflation target). In
an open economy, one could add a number of other variables in this rule—for
example, the external current account or the foreign output gap. Also, the rule
could include other variables that reflect conditions in the domestic economy,
such as the government’s budget balance or other fiscal variables. In fact, within
this context it is also feasible to include in a Taylor rule different inflation
measures, like in the following rule: r = r*+α (γ (π
a– π *) + (1 – γ )(π
p– π *)),
where  π
a is actual inflation and π
p is projected inflation and 0 < γ < 1. 
11Also see Svensson (2002).
12See, for example, Svensson (2001) or Kozicki (1999) for an overview.
13See Taylor (1993) for the original formulation.Moreover, one could include competing inflation projections in a similar fashion.
Hence, Taylor rules are very flexible and can be specified to encompass a number
of country-specific considerations.
As a rough check on the monetary policy stance in an IMF program context,
it would probably be important to specify monetary policy rules somewhat
cautiously, and to reduce the likelihood of false alarms. For example, for a Taylor
rule one could choose r –, the equilibrium real interest rate that underlies r*, to be
slightly lower than the best available estimate based on historical data; this would
allow for some limited flexibility on interest rate policies. Alternatively, one could
use a range of equilibrium interest rates to generate Taylor rule “bands” analogous
to target bands for inflation. 
However, given that a key element in a simple monetary policy rule is the
parametric reaction to deviations between actual or projected inflation and the
inflation target, an obvious weakness of such an approach is that it would not react
to shocks to variables that are omitted from the rule—for example, a Taylor rule
would only show a reaction to an external shock if that shock was, in one way or
another, part of the rule. Also, simple linear policy rules, like the ones discussed
here, would not be adequate for judging the stance of monetary policy in special
circumstances, for instance when a country is just exiting from a period of high
inflation. 
Given the limitations, in an inflation targeting context, of both the traditional
quantitative NDA ceilings and of simple monetary policy rules, and considering
the difficulties that would exist in specifying and agreeing in advance on a detailed
monetary policy reaction function, there appears to be an enhanced role for regular
periodic policy reviews that would include a detailed assessment of monetary
policy in the context of inflation targeting. In this regard, the IMF program would
still need to specify an inflation path consistent with the official inflation targets.
While official inflation targets tend to be annual, however, the program would
establish more frequent, say quarterly, intermediate inflation targets. In the context
of the regular IMF program reviews, current and projected inflation would be
compared with the target path, and agreement on specific policy actions would be
reached whenever the outlook suggested that inflation objectives were likely to be
missed. 
IV. Adapting Monetary Conditionality to Inflation Targeting in Brazil
Brazil was the first inflation targeting country with an IMF program, and it took
some time to tailor the program to the floating exchange rate regime with the
nominal inflation target. In part, this reflected the need to take into account the
institutional constraints that require similarity of treatment and, hence, a high
degree of comparability of IMF programs across countries. 
Initially, the program with Brazil relied on traditional monetary condition-
ality—an NIR floor and an NDA ceiling—although it introduced some interesting
innovations as well. In general, as shown in Table 3, whereas the initial program
in December 1998—still under the fixed exchange rate regime—relied mainly on
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were made less binding after Brazil adopted the inflation targeting framework, and
were completely phased out in June 2000 with the inflation targeting framework
fully established. In contrast, while the initial program included an NIR floor that
was intentionally fixed at a low (or nonbinding) level to allow the Central Bank of
Brazil (BCB) to use part of its actual NIR to defend the fixed exchange rate, if
needed, the NIR floor became the key instrument of conditionality in the first few
reviews in 1999, in an environment where uncertainty concerning the new mone-
tary policy framework (and with it the new nominal anchor for inflation expecta-
tions) was still considerably high. In July 1999, shortly after Brazil had formally
established its inflation targeting framework, the NIR/NDA conditionality was
supplemented with a general consultation mechanism on inflation targets. In
November 1999, less than six months after the inflation targeting framework had
been put in place, the IMF program incorporated a formal consultation mechanism
on inflation to supplement the floor on NIR. 
The progressive shift away from NDA ceilings following the adoption of the
inflation targeting framework reflected the need to adapt the program to the
changes in the monetary policy regime. The shift also reflected the growing real-
ization of the fact that base money did not appear to play a significant role in the
monetary transmission mechanism in Brazil.14 In particular, seasonalities, remon-
etization under the Real Plan, and the effects of tax changes have been quantita-
tively more important and statistically more significant determinants of the
demand for base money than the traditional variables, income, or the interest
rate.15 In fact, the demand for base money seemed not very sensitive to interest
rates at all.
The formal consultation mechanism on inflation, introduced in the November
1999 review of the program, was based on the annual central inflation target and
INFLATION TARGETING IN IMF-SUPPORTED ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS
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14In general, main transmission channels of monetary policy are the exchange rate, wages, asset
prices, and aggregate demand. In Brazil, and in light of the economic conditions that have prevailed since
inflation targeting was adopted in mid-1999 (that is, the fairly high real interest rates, tight fiscal policies,
relatively subdued aggregate demand, and negative real wage growth), the exchange rate would appear to
have been the main actual channel of transmission to inflation. This would be consistent with recent find-
ings that suggest that the unwinding of real exchange rate misalignments in the context of a depreciation
has been the most important determinant of inflation in developing economies (Goldfajn and Werlang,
2000; for Brazil see also Schwartz, 1999). Of course, in a floating exchange rate regime, the exchange rate
itself is not a policy variable. For a discussion of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
Brazil, see Rabanal and Schwartz (2001a).
15To establish NDA ceilings, the demand for base money was estimated as the sum of its two parts:
currency issued and reserves on demand deposits. Currency issued was modeled as a function of a linear
trend (to capture the ongoing remonetization of the economy), various seasonal dummies (for example,
for December, January, and February), and lagged dependent variables. Demand deposits were modeled
as a function of seasonal dummies, dummies for tax effects (for example, changes in the tax on financial
transactions (CPMF)), and the nominal interest rate. Reserves on demand deposits were derived by
applying an effective reserve rate to the projected level of demand deposits. In the short term, these projec-
tions fared quite well, but larger deviations from the econometric estimates occurred when there were
shifts in seasonalities (for example, carnival in March instead of February), or when special factors, like
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)the tolerance bands that had been announced by the Brazilian government.16
Under the program, a simple linear quarterly path was established, where the
central inflation target declined by 0.5 percentage points each quarter.17 Also, the
program established a two-tier “consultation band” around the central target: an
“outer band” with a width of +/–2 percentage points around the central target path,
and an “inner band” with a width of +/–1 percentage points around the central
target path. Accordingly, and this was the innovation in conditionality, the
Brazilian authorities would informally consult with IMF staff on the appropriate
policy response if the observed 12-month rate of IPCA (a consumer price index)
inflation were to go outside the inner band; they would more formally consult with
the IMF Executive Board on the appropriate policy response if the observed
12-month rate of inflation were to go outside the outer band.
How well did this mechanism work? Figure 1 shows Brazil’s actual inflation
performance in relation to the established consultation bands during 1999–01. In
general, the BCB met its official inflation targets for both end-1999 and end-2000.
The consultation mechanism on inflation with the IMF staff was triggered twice,
first in September 2000, when the 12-month rate of consumer price (IPCA) infla-
tion reached 7.8 percent, thereby exceeding the program’s 7.5 percent ceiling of
the inner band, and then again in June 2001, when the 12-month rate of IPCA
inflation reached 7.4 percent, thereby exceeding the program’s 6.9 percent ceiling
of the inner band. The consultation mechanism with the IMF Executive Board did
not have to be invoked, as deviations from the central target path remained within
the +/–2 percentage-point spread. 
The first consultation with IMF staff largely resulted from a temporary surge
in monthly inflation rates in July and August 2000, due to unanticipated supply
shocks that abated in September 2000; core inflation had already remained rela-
tively more subdued throughout the third quarter of 2000. In line with expecta-
tions, and facilitated by the continued firm stance of monetary policy, the rate of
inflation in consumer prices declined in the fourth quarter of 2000 to match the
official 6 percent target by end-2000. The second consultation with staff largely
resulted from the pass-through to domestic prices that reflected the significant
weakening of the Brazilian real against the U.S. dollar during late 2000 and in the
first half of 2001, in the context of the lingering crisis in Argentina. These events
ultimately caused Brazil to enter into a new stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the
IMF in late 2001, rather than letting the arrangement expire in December 2001.
While the consultation mechanism has been useful in drawing attention to
events that could threaten achievement of the government’s official inflation
target, the mechanism itself, which relies exclusively on comparing actual infla-
tion outcomes against a target path, can be criticized for being largely backward
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16Specifically, the announced inflation target was 8 percent at end-1999, 6 percent at end-2000, and
4 percent at end-2001, each with a tolerance band of +/–2 percentage points around the central target. 
17A linear path was chosen mainly for simplicity. Another simple option would have been to estab-
lish a path for the target 12-month inflation rate on the basis of inflation that has already happened, and
then simply add to that one-quarter of the year-end inflation target. For example, at the beginning of 2000,
the target for, say, June 2000 could have been established by adding to the already known inflation
outcome for July–December 1999, one half of the year-end target for 2000.looking. In the case of Brazil, it had become clear well ahead of time that the
September 2000 and June 2001 ceilings for the inner band would in all likelihood
be missed. More generally, the need for policy action would usually be expected
to come well before the activation of the program’s trigger mechanism for consul-
tation. These considerations may argue in favor of using a more forward-looking
monetary conditionality device.
V. Actual Policies and Taylor Rules: An Application to Brazil
Toward the background of this discussion, and mainly for illustrative purposes,
this section explores the usefulness of some simple Taylor rules as an option for
strengthening the monitoring of the monetary policy stance in the context of an
IMF program in a country operating under an inflation targeting framework. The
basic idea is simple: if it were possible to conclude that a simple monetary policy
rule provides a rough indication of the appropriateness of a country’s monetary
policy stance vis-à-vis the inflation target, then it could usefully be employed as
an automatic trigger mechanism for consultations in an IMF program context. To
the extent that the monetary policy rule includes forward-looking elements (for
example, inflation expectations), it could represent a more timely mechanism than
the consultation mechanism that has been included in the program with Brazil. 



















































































































































Figure 1. Brazil: 12-Month Rate of Consumer Price Inflation (IPCA) and 
IMF Program Consultation Bands on Inflation
Sources: IGBE and IMF staff estimates.For purposes of illustration, we use, as an example, the experience of Brazil during
its first 18 months under inflation targeting. Given the BCB’s general success with
inflation targeting, we ask whether a simple Taylor rule would have provided a
useful assessment of the monetary policy stance.
Figures 2 and 3 show the actual interest rate, the annualized overnight interest
rate (“SELIC rate”), plotted against two alternative Taylor rules, with different
values for the α and β parameters. In the first alternative, α , the parameter on the
output gap, equals 0.5, and β , the parameter on the deviation of actual inflation
from target, equals 1.5. The second version is an “aggressive” Taylor rule, where
only the deviation of inflation from target features in the rule (β = 2). Figure 3
differs from Figure 2 in that it includes an interest smoothing parameter ρ ,w hich
is set equal to 0.6.18 Initially, in both Figures 2 and 3 the actual 12-month rate of
inflation is used in the simple Taylor rule. The Taylor “bands” shown in these two
figures are generated by different assumptions on the equilibrium real interest rate
r –,r anging from 10 percent to 12 percent. For the purpose of the exercise, the
potential output growth rate was assumed to be 4.5 percent; a lower potential
growth rate (of, say, 4.0 percent) would have resulted in a smaller output gap, and
therefore kept the Taylor band at a slightly higher level.
In both Figures 2 and 3 we can clearly distinguish several, fairly short, subpe-
riods during July 1999–June 2001. In general, the BCB followed a fairly cautious
approach, where its main policy instrument, the SELIC rate, was kept broadly at
or slightly above the level suggested by the Taylor bands, maybe with the possible
exception of late-1999/early-2000. Starting in mid-2000, however, following a
period of inflation surprises related to increased external uncertainties and a nega-
tive agricultural supply shock, and as the BCB continued to reduce the SELIC rate
in late 2000, the Taylor bands would probably have suggested keeping the SELIC
rate at the slightly higher level than what was actually done by the BCB, particu-
larly when growth considerations are ignored (α = 0). In light of the likely infla-
tion outcome for 2001, with the year-end inflation target of 4 percent (with a +/–2
percent tolerance interval) likely to be missed slightly, the Taylor rule would have
helped to trigger discussions early on.
Initially, during July–September 1999, the BCB kept the SELIC rate at a
higher level than what a simple Taylor rule would have suggested on the basis of
the relatively low pass-through that had occurred in the first couple of months after
the Real was left to float. When the inflation targeting framework was launched in
July 1999, inflation was at a very moderate level but expected to rise. Concerned
about an increasing pass-through (given the existing transmission lags), and
having to establish its reputation, the BCB initially adopted a tougher policy
stance than what would have been suggested by a simple Taylor rule without
expectational variables. In addition, caution during this early period also seemed
warranted due to a deterioration in inflation expectation in early July 1999 that
was brought about by an adjustment of government-managed prices.19
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18The interest smoothing parameter introduces some inertia into the Taylor rule by mitigating the
extent to which the central bank reacts to new information. See the Appendix for further detail on the exer-
cises that were carried out.























































































































































Figure 2. Brazil: Taylor Rules with Current Inflation
2a. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0.5, b = 1.5) 
No Interest Rate Smoothing






















































































































































2b. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0, b = 2) 
No Interest Rate SmoothingThe second period runs from October 1999 to January–February 2000, when
inflation had already picked up significantly, peaking in December 1999. During
that period, the BCB basically “remained put,” and, in particular, it did not raise
the SELIC rate as would have been suggested by a simple Taylor rule. The
increase suggested by a simple Taylor rule would have been particularly large
without interest smoothing (Figure 2), whereas with interest smoothing (Figure 3),
and depending on the value that is used for the equilibrium real interest rate (r –),
the suggested increase would not necessarily have needed to be large. It is clear
that, although in the last quarter of 1999 inflation was higher than expected, this
was perceived as transitory by the Brazilian authorities. This view was also
supported by market surveys, which continued to show that year 2000 inflation
was expected to be significantly below 1999 inflation. As a result, the actual
SELIC rate was kept slightly below the rate suggested by a simple Taylor rule
without expectational variables. 
A third period runs from about February 2000 to June 2000, when inflation
continued on a downward trend and remained in line with the inflation target. The
BCB acted cautiously during this period, with the actual SELIC rate held basically
constant at 18.5 percent until June 2000, also in light of new external uncertainties
(including, for example, increases in oil prices and stock market volatility), and
some domestic uncertainties relating to pending Supreme Court decisions
(concerning the revaluation of some savings accounts that had been underindexed
for inflation in the late 1980s and early 1990s). Due to the reduction in actual
inflation, the actual SELIC rate remained, in general slightly above the bands of
our simple Taylor rule, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
A fourth period runs from mid-2000 to about September 2000, when,
following the positive inflation surprises during the first half of 2000, the BCB
reduced the SELIC rate by 100 basis points in June 2000, then by a further 50
basis points in early July, and again by another 50 basis points later in July. As a
result, in a 30-day period, the short-term interest rate was lowered by 200 basis
points to 16.5 percent. Interestingly, just as the BCB lowered the SELIC rate
during June and July of 2000, the simple Taylor rule would have suggested
increasing interest rates. This largely reflected an unexpected negative agricultural
supply shock that had pushed up food prices due to adverse weather conditions,
and an increase in inflation due to the strong adjustment of government-managed
prices in a single month (July 2000), which included price adjustments of oil
derivatives, electricity, and telecommunication services. It also reflected the fact
that the output gap was rapidly narrowing as average real GDP growth went from
0.8 percent in 1999 to 4.4 percent in 2000. However, the BCB essentially read
these developments as factors that would not call into question meeting the year’s
inflation target, and that could be addressed by holding back on further interest
rate reductions. In essence, this interpretation was correct, as, during the last
quarter of 2000, the Taylor band fell back to levels that had prevailed earlier in the
year, as the July–August surge in food prices was winding down. During this
period, the actual SELIC rate remained broadly within or just below the Taylor
bands shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Mario I.Blejer,Alfredo M.Leone,Pau Rabanal,and Gerd Schwartz























































































































































Figure 3. Brazil: Taylor Rules with Current Inflation
3a. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0.5, b = 1.5) 






















































































































































3b. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0, b = 2) 
Interest Rate Smoothing (rho = 0.6)
Source: BCB and authors’ estimates.Starting in early 2001 and for the first half of the year, the simple Taylor bands
signaled a need to increase interest rates, generally to levels above the ones main-
tained by the BCB, particularly when ignoring output considerations (which, in
early 2001, showed an economy that was slowing down considerably in light of
external factors and domestic energy rationing, thereby again opening an output
gap). For example, a simple Taylor rule with no output considerations and no
interest smoothing (Figure 2b), would, in an IMF program context, have triggered
a consultation on the monetary policy stance in the first quarter of 2001, when the
BCB had continued lowering the SELIC rate while the Taylor rule itself would
have suggested an increase. With an actual 2001 inflation outcome of 6.7 percent,
which was outside of the +/–2 percent tolerance interval around the year-end infla-
tion target of 4 percent, a Taylor rule would have helped to trigger discussions
already in the beginning of 2001, if not earlier, when, arguably, the BCB reacted
too slowly to the need to raise interest rates.
This simple exercise may be interpreted in different ways, depending on the
intended use of the Taylor rule. Simple mechanistic rules are not useful in policy-
making, a fact that is amply highlighted in the recent literature, including on the
still rather new Brazilian experience.20 Policy decisions have to be made on the
basis of more complex considerations, and rules and models can only be one input
in these decisions. Monetary policy rules are even simpler than standard models
used by central banks to gauge their own policies, and even these models are still
considered “small-scale”21 compared to potentially more complex ones.
At the same time, however, simple rules—even of the type just discussed—may
provide a rough first evaluation of a policy stance.22 Simple Taylor rules may only
be expected to perform satisfactorily in an environment where relatively low infla-
tion has already been achieved, and where the overall macroeconomic environment
is fairly stable (for example, continued tight fiscal polices, and a stable exchange
rate). In a more unstable or uncertain environment, other variables should be
included in the Taylor rule to make it more “realistic.” Making monetary rules more
realistic would not necessarily mean making them more complicated. In general,
central banks do not only react to current levels of specific variables but also to their
expected future levels—they are clearly forward looking. Since the different chan-
nels of transmission of monetary policy are known to operate with some lags, all
central banks forecast the behavior of inflation in one way or another. These expec-
tations or forecasts could be put to use in the Taylor rules.
Accordingly, in Figures 4 and 5 we employ again a simple Taylor rule but use
market projections of inflation, as derived from the BCB’s daily survey on market
expectations.23 In these examples, the main elements remain qualitatively
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20See, for example, Bogdanski, de Freitas, Goldfajn, and Tombini (2001).
21See Bogdanski, Tombini, and Werlang (2000) for the case of Brazil. Also see Rabanal and Schwartz
(2001b) for a review of the inflation forecasting performance of the small-scale model used by the BCB.
22This is probably also one of the reasons why the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, for
example, has been publishing the results of simple Taylor rules and McCallum rules in its monthly
economic reports. See the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (1999–2000).
23For the purpose of the Taylor rules, the expected inflation for a given month was generated by using
the average expected inflation for that month, as shown in surveys carried out by the BCB in the month
immediately preceding that month.unchanged from the previous analysis, also because expectations matched actual
outcomes fairly closely. In general, there were again three periods where, if it had
been employed in an IMF program context, a Taylor rule would have triggered an
early consultation on the monetary policy stance.24 First in late 1999, when the
expectations of a higher future pass-through from currency depreciation to infla-
tion peaked together with actual inflation; second in mid-2000, when Brazil expe-
rienced, among others, an agricultural supply shock that again pushed up inflation
expectations; and third in early 2001, when inflation expectations took off, also in
light of the domestic energy crisis and the substantial weakening of the exchange
rate, in part reflecting the lingering concerns about Argentina. While the first two
eventually turned out to be more transitory elements that could be accommodated
by the inflation target without necessarily changing the policy stance, the latter
had a more lasting impact, and eventually required the BCB to tighten its policy
stance, albeit too late to keep the 2001 inflation outturn within the target range. A
priori, however, each of these events would reasonably have been a good occasion
to review the monetary policy stance in an IMF program context, and a Taylor rule
could have been used as one option for triggering such consultations. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
In IMF programs, conditionality links the achievement of a set of policy objectives
to continued access to Fund resources. Conditionality provides a yardstick for
evaluating whether the policies that are being carried out are moving the country
toward the achievement of stated policy objectives, in particular a sustainable
external balance. By doing so, conditionality also safeguards the temporary use of
the IMF’s resources. Traditionally, program conditionality in the monetary area
has relied on two performance criteria: a ceiling on the central bank’s NDA and a
floor on its NIR. The primary focus of this approach has always been a program’s
external viability, rather than inflation. The main role of the NIR floor is to indi-
cate whether an IMF program is likely to achieve its external objective, while the
ceiling on NDA seeks to ensure that this objective is not jeopardized by excessive
credit expansion or by sterilized intervention—that is, by compensating unpro-
grammed NIR losses through additional credit creation. The framework assumes
that the demand for base money matters from a macroeconomic perspective, and
that it is stable and predictable.
As argued in this paper, in program countries that carry out their monetary
policies on the basis of explicit inflation targets, it would seem helpful to adapt
traditional monetary conditionality to take into account the specific features of
inflation targeting. This would help to improve the correspondence between the
monetary objectives of the central bank and the targets of the IMF-supported
adjustment program, and the instruments that are used to achieve these targets and
objectives. By the same token, it would also facilitate communication of central
bank policies to the markets. 
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Figure 4. Brazil: Taylor Rules with Market Expectations of Inflation
4a. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor rule (a = 0.5, b = 1.5)






















































































































































4b. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0, b = 2)
No Interest Rate Smoothing
Source: BCB and authors’ estimates.Clearly, as a first step, a program could include, as was the case in Brazil, the
government’s inflation target itself. Often, this may require specifying the target
in some more detail than the official target. For example, most countries operate
with annual inflation targets; however, as IMF programs are frequently monitored
on a quarterly basis, additional quarterly inflation objectives may have to be
added. Furthermore, there needs to be a mechanism for consultations that allows
for program reviews to take place if inflation goes off track. This, in turn, would
require establishing parameters around the targeted inflation rate that would
trigger such reviews. In the case of Brazil it was decided to establish consultation
bands around the central target, where, depending on the size of the deviation
from the target, consultations with either IMF staff or its Executive Board would
be triggered. 
A potential drawback of monitoring a program on the basis of inflation
outcomes—for example, on the basis of the actual 12-month rate of inflation vis-
à-vis the target 12-month rate of inflation—is that this is largely backward
looking; that is, the inflation outcome itself offers no guidance as to the appropri-
ateness of the stance of monetary policies. Hence, inflation targets in the context
of an IMF program work much in the same way in which they are used by the
government: they are a parameter that helps to carry out an ex post analysis of
central bank policies. However, to be able to say something about the appropri-
ateness of the current monetary policy stance, it is not enough to look at actual
inflation. This raises the question whether there are additional options for strength-
ening monetary conditionality under inflation targeting in the context of an IMF
program.25 This could be achieved either by regular frequent consultations or by a
forward-looking trigger mechanism for consultations between the country author-
ities and the IMF.
One option that has been explored in this paper, and on which further analysis
would be desirable, is to consider simple monetary policy rules, such as Taylor
rules or McCallum rules, as a potential trigger mechanism for such consultations.
While simple policy rules would not be a useful device for policymaking, they do
provide a rough first evaluation of a policy stance. To illustrate the point, we tested
various simple Taylor rules, using the experience of Brazil in its first two years
under inflation targeting as an example. The results of the exercise suggest that
simple mechanical rules may indeed provide a rough initial yardstick on the
appropriate level of interest rates, particularly in an environment where relatively
low inflation has already been achieved, and where the overall macroeconomic
environment is fairly stable (for example, continued tight fiscal polices, and a
stable exchange rate). 
To strengthen conditionality, and, in particular, to help monitor the stance of
monetary policies vis-à-vis a government’s inflation target, Taylor rules or other
rules that provide for a rough evaluation of central bank policies are an area that
could usefully be explored further. In general, to be useful in an IMF program
context, the rules should be kept simple, and forward looking, in the sense that
they should include inflation expectations.
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Figure 5. Brazil: Taylor Rules with Market Expectations of Inflation
5a. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0.5, b = 1.5)






















































































































































5b. The SELIC and a Simple Taylor Rule (a = 0, b = 2)
Interest Rate Smoothing (rho = 0.6)
Source: BCB and authors’ estimates.APPENDIX
Taylor Rule Exercise for Brazil
We use a simple Taylor rule for Brazil during 1999–2001 to compare actual policy outcomes
with rule-based policy prescriptions. Using monthly data, the rule we use takes the standard
form, with rt = ρ rt–1 + (1 – ρ)  [r* + α yt +β ( π t – π * t )] and r* = r – = π * t ,w here rt is the annual-
ized overnight interest rate (SELIC) in period t; ρ is the interest smoothing parameter with 0 ≤
ρ ≤ 1; yt is the output gap in period t; π t is the 12-month inflation rate in period t; π * t  is the infla-
tion target applicable to period t; r* is the equilibrium nominal interest rate; and r – is the equi-
librium real interest rate. Parameters α and β are the parameters of the Taylor rule, where, for
simplicity, we choose those suggested in Taylor’s original formulation with α equal to either 0
or 0.5, depending on whether or not output considerations can be assumed to be part of the
central bank’s objective function, and β being either 2 or 1.5, accordingly.
In general, we use monthly end-of-period data for the SELIC rate and the other variables in
the model. The output gap was first estimated by fitting a linear trend on the natural logarithm of
monthly GDP, as estimated by the BCB. This yielded a relatively low potential real output growth,
and we consequently used values in the range of 3–4 percent as being more realistic assumptions.
The value of the equilibrium real interest rate was initially assumed to be 12.0 percent, but we
then used values in the 10.5 percent to 12.5 percent range to generate the Taylor rule bands. 
The inflation target for each month is a linear extrapolation of the quarterly targets for
December 1999 to June 2001 that were used under the IMF program. For the period before
December 1999, when inflation was still low, we used the lower band of the target range to derive
the Taylor rule and then linearly increased it to reach 8 percent (the central target) in December
1999. Hence, for July 1999, we assume that the BCB did set its inflation target in the lower limit
of its annual band for 1999 (6 percent), and that it increased this linearly to reach the inflation
target of 8 percent in December 1999. However, using the December 1999 target for the period
leading up to December 1999 did not change the outcomes qualitatively. Expected inflation for a
given month (used in Figures 4 and 5) is the inflation expectation for the month at the beginning
of the month, calculated as the average market expectation according to the BCB survey; other
definitions of inflation expectations did not alter the results significantly.
We consider four policy rules: the original Taylor rule (with α = 0.5 and β =1.5), a more
aggressive rule that only targets inflation (α = 0, β = 2), and for both rules we consider the case
of no interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0) and with interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0.6). Choosing ρ =
0.6 would seem to strike a balance between having a fairly high degree of interest rate
smoothing and letting the effect “die out” after only a few periods.
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